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TO HAVE AND HAVE NOT-NANTUCKET, 
MARTHA'S VINEYARD, AND TIlE PUBLIC 
TRUST DOCTRINE: REMEMBERING TIlE 
LAND TIlAT TIME FORGOT 
CHRISTOPHER COLI McMAHON* 
Abstract: The Public Trust Doctrine, an ancient mandate under which 
the sovereign holds unique natural resources in trust for the benefit of 
the general public, has been adopted by the United States as a staple of 
American property law. While the federal government is the ultimate 
trustee of these lands, the states may flexibly interpret and administer this 
law to maximize the public benefit derived from trust resources. For 
instance, although most states own the land between the high and low 
tide lines in trust for its citizens, Massachusetts bases its common law 
interpretation of the Doctrine on the Colonial Ordinance of 1641-41, a 
statute passed by the early settlers of the commonwealth providing for 
private ownership of the ocean flats. However, the current application of 
the Doctrine to the beaches of Martha's Vineyard and Nantucket directly 
contradicts the overall intent of the Doctrine. Although the Supreme 
Court of the United States and the Supreme Judicial Court of Mass-
achusetts have reasoned otherwise, there are strong historical, legal, and 
public policy arguments that these islands are instead subject to the tradi-
tional common law application of the Doctrine. 
But look! here come more crowds, pacing straight for the water, and seem-
ingly bound for a dive. Strange! Nothing will content them but the extremist 
limit of land. . . . They must get just as near the water as they possibly can 
without falling in. Tell me, does the magnetic virtue of the needles of the 
compasses of all these ships attract them thither? 
-Herman Melville! 
* Articles Editor, BOSTIlN COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 2003-04. 
This note was possible only through the invaluable assistance of Professor Zygmunt Plater, 
Professor of Law at Boston College Law School, who inspired this topic; Kelly Regan and 
Drew Skroback, who conducted some preliminary research regarding the subject; and 
Matthew Fee and Finn Murphy, members of the Nantucket Board of Selectmen. 
I HERMAN MELVILLE, MOBy-DICK, OR, THE WHALE 2 (Luther S. Mansfield & Howard P. 
Vincen t eds., Hendricks House 1952) (1851). 
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INTRODUCTION 
Massachusetts's version of the public trust doctrine (the Doc-
trine) and William "Billy" Bulger: they are two Yankee phenomena as 
unique as they are controversial.2 Therefore, it is perhaps fitting that 
several years ago the two clashed in a conflict representing the oppo-
site ends of the spectrum of this increasingly litigated area of property 
law concerning public use of private beachfront property in the 
commonwealth.3 
President of the Massachusetts Senate at the time, Mr. Bulger at-
tempted to briefly escape the cares of the state house by taking a dip 
off the coast of Nantucket.4 Much to his chagrin, however, he was 
abruptly in terrupted and chased off what proved to be a private 
beach.5 Not to be deterred, he responded to this affront by attempt-
ing to amend the law concerning public use of private beaches in the 
commonwealth, an action that was ultimately unsuccessful.6 
This anecdote illustrates a little-known and unique facet of Mas-
sachusetts law7 concerning the Doctrine, an ancient law that protects 
public access to certain unique natural resources, such as shorelines, 
against exclusion by private property owners.s While the public's right 
to access such resources by traversing private property is an issue of 
much dispute,9 most states own the flats-that portion of the beach 
2 William Bulger served as the outspoken President of the Massachusetts Senate from 
1978 to 1996, and more recently held the post of President of the University of Massachu-
setts. See Morning Edition: Analysis: President of the University of Massachusetts Resigns (NPR radio 
broadcast, Aug. 7, 2003), 2003 WL 4859202. Always a lightning rod for controversy, Mr. Bul-
ger was recently entangled in a federal probe concerning his ties to the illegal activities of his 
brother, James "Whitey' Bulger, head of the notorious Winter Hill Gang, an organized crime 
syndicate formerly based in South Boston. See J.M. Lawrence, Bulger Hearing Will Be Public, Fed 
Panel Won't Meet Behind Closed Doors, BOSTON HERALD, May 17, 2003, at 5. As a result of 
mounting public pressure, Mr. Bulger announced his resignation from the presidency of the 
University of Massachusetts on August 6, 2003. See Patrick Healy, Bulger Set to Resign Today: Said 
to Believe Staying Would Divide UMass, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 6, 2003, at AI. 
3 See Sarah Schweitzer, Nantucket's Open Question: Town Seeking to Secure Public Access to the 
Beaches, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 2, 2003, at B1. 
4 See id. 
5Id. 
6Id. 
7 See MASS. BAY COLONY, GEN. LAWES & LIBERTYES, LIBERTIES COMMON (1641) 
(amended 1647), reprinted in THE BUOK OF THE GENERAl. LAWES AND LIBER"IYES CONCERN-
ING THE INHABITANTS OF THE MASSACHUSETTS 35 (Thomas G. Barnes ed., The 
Huntington Library 1975) (1648) [hereinafter COLONIAL ORDINANCE]. 
8 J. INST. 2.1.1; JESSE DUKEMENIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 818 (4th ed. 1998); see 
COLONIAl. ORDINANCE, supra note 7, at 35. 
9 See, e.g., Mathews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355, 358 (NJ. 1984). In 
this case the public's trust right to use the flats was a foregone conclusion. See id. The con-
2004] The Shoreline Public Trust on Nantucket and Martha's Vineyard 433 
between the mean high- and low-tide lines-in trust for use and en-
joymen t by the public as beneficiaries of the public trust. IO 
The Doctrine, however, is also a flexible and dynamic tool that 
may be employed to maximize the public benefit derived from trust 
resources.ll As such, it may be modified in the face of the peculiar, 
time-specific challenges faced by particular societies in order to 
achieve this end.I2 Consistent with this flexibility, the Common-
wealth's unique application of this ancient mandate is based on the 
Colonial Ordinance of 1641-47 (the Ordinance), a statute enacted in 
the seventeenth century by the Massachusetts Bay Colony)3 This law 
modified the Doctrine, a cornerstone of the English common law 
concerning property rights, in response to the economic realities of 
the settlement. l4 The legacy of the Ordinance still affects Massachu-
setts today, and has been incorporated into the commonwealth's 
common lawI5 and statutory codification of the Doctrine.I6 Therefore, 
as opposed to virtually every other state in the Union,I7 private beach-
front owners in the commonwealth possess a fee title down to the low 
watermark. IS As a result, in most cases these private owners are within 
their rights in ejecting the general public, including its elected 
officials, from these trust lands.I9 
troversy arose when a private beach club refused public access across the sand above the 
high tide line in order to reach the trust resource. See id. 
IOSee Julia M. Underwood, Comment, Intertidal Zone Aquaculture and Public Trust Doc-
trine, 2 OCEAN & COASTAL LJ. 383, 383 (1997). 
II See Jose Fernandez, Untwisting the Common Law: Public Trust and the Massachusetts Co-
lonial Ordinance, 62 ALB. L. REv. 623, 631-32 (1998). 
12 See id. at 632. 
U See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d 561, 565 (Mass. 1974) (examining the 
common law concerning the Ordinance and stating that "it has long been interpreted as 
effecting a grant of the tidal land to all coastal owners in the Commonwealth. ft). 
14 Storer v. Freeman, 6 Mass. (5 Tyng) 435, 438 (1810) (describing the economic 
needs that gave rise to the Ordinance and its modification of the common law); William L. 
Lahey, Tidelands, Waterways and Great Pond Law, in 1 MASS. CONTINUING LEGAL Enuc., 
MASSACHUSETTS ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 11-1, 11-2-1 (2002). 
15 See, e.g., opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d at 565-66. 
16 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 91, §§ 14, 18 (2002). 
17 Mitchell W. Feeney, Regulating Seaweed Harvesting in Maine: The Public and Private In-
terests in an Emerging Marine Resource Industry, 7 OCEAN & COASTAL LJ. 329, 338 (2002). 
Originally incorporated under the jurisdiction of the Massachusetts Bay Colony, Maine 
adopted the provisions of the Colonial Ordinance of 1641-47 (the Ordinance) as its 
common law concerning the application of the public trust doctrine (the Doctrine). Id. 
Mter achieving statehood, the courts continued to apply Massachusetts's version of the 
Doctrine, and Maine is the only other state besides Massachusetts to do so today. Id. 
18See, e.g., Opinion oftheJustices, 313 N.E.2d at 568. 
19 See id. at 568; Schweitzer, supm note 3, at Bl. 
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This right has led to a somewhat contradictory state of affairs, 
especially when considering the Doctrine's emphasis on protecting 
the public's rights to enjoy resources, such as ocean beaches,20 and 
the emergence of recreation as a protected trust interest.21 The con-
tradictions are further highlighted in view of the appeal of the 
beaches on the islands of Nantucket and Martha's Vineyard as attrac-
tive tourist destinations that draw millions of visitors annually.22 
Local officials on Nantucket have recognized this situation, and 
the battle between private beachfront property owners and would-be 
sunbathers has become a consistent source of tension on both this is-
land and Martha's Vineyard.23 The Nantucket Board of Selectmen's 
most recent attempt to address this dilemma is the proposed One 
Beach initiative, designed to increase public access to the island's pri-
vately-owned beaches. Under this initiative, private beach owners would 
grant easements in return for tax benefits in the form of reduced 
property assessments on the local level, and income tax deductions for 
these charitable contributions on the federallevel. 24 This plan has been 
met with mixed reactions among the island community and is likely to 
face substantial legal challenges in the months and years ahead.25 
It is possible, however, that the battle to reclaim the beaches of 
Nantucket may already be halfwon. The Ordinance was enacted in the 
mid-seventeenth century,26 and the islands were not incorporated into 
20 See]. INST. 2.1.1. 
21 See infra notes 70-71 and accompanying text; see also Serena Williams, Sustaining Ur-
ban Green Spaces: Can Public Parks Be Protected Under the Public Trust Doctrine~, 10 S.C. ENVTL. 
LJ 23, 24 (2002). 
22 See Victor Gautam, From the Field: Cape Cod and the Islands: Working Toward a Sustain-
able Year-round Economy. MASS. BENCHMARKS, Summer 1999, at 19. 19-23. http://www. 
massbenchmarks.org/ issues/99sununer / pdf/99sum_v2i3.pdf (last visited Oct. 26. 2003). 
23 Interview with Mathew Fee. Nantucket Board of Selectmen. on Nantucket. Mass. 
(Apr. 3. 2002). Mr. Fee indicated that disputes between private beach owners and would-be 
sunbathers arise on Nantucket at least once every ten years. Id. 
24 Nantucket. Mass .• Ordinance One Beach. Once and For All (Proposed 2003). Local 
authorities see the One Beach initiative as a solution to beach access disputes. The pro-
posal would allow owners to retain title to their land and therefore avoid costly eminent 
domain actions on these properties, a course of action local officials are reluctant to pur-
sue. Id. In addition. the town asserts that this beach access scheme will, in effect. merely 
solidifY the present state of affairs on Nantucket. since private beach owners on the island 
have generally proven themselves amenable to permitting public access to their beaches. 
Id. Town officials estimate that it will take approximately two to three years to secure all of 
the easements and settle all of the takings claims. and are reserving their judgment as to 
the cost of the project. which they say will depend on various legal costs and the number of 
challenges mounted by landowners. Id. 
25 See Schweitzer. supra note 3, at Bl. 
26 See COLONIAL ORDINANCE. supra note 7. at 35. 
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present-day Massachusetts until approximately fifty years later.2' This 
situation begs the question whether the islands' beaches are instead 
subject to the traditional common-law application of the Doctrine, 
practiced on almost every beach in the coun try, which, while not affect-
ing private-property rights in the sand above the high-tide line, never-
theless provides for state ownership of the ocean f1ats. 28 This question is 
particularly relevant when considered in light of the following factors: 
(1) the independent history of Nantucket and Martha's Vineyard; (2) 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) precedent regarding other 
trust resources in the state; (3) the overall purpose of the Doctrine and 
its recently expanding scope; (4) the mandates of the United States 
Supreme Court regarding the states' duty to protect the public's trust 
interests; and (5) the unique trust needs of the islands as compared to 
the rest of the state.29 According to the Court and the SJC, however, the 
answer is clear. These courts have unequivocally indicated that the Or-
dinance is the established common law of the commonwealth, and 
therefore applies to the entirety ofits ocean f1ats. 30 
This Note argues, however, that these decisions are misguided, 
and calls for a further modification of the public's trust rights as they 
concern the islands of Nantucket and Martha's Vineyard. Part I ex-
plores the ancien t origins and English common law evolution of the 
Doctrine. It then examines the Doctrine's modification and develop-
ment in colonial and post-colonial Massachusetts. Next, it explores 
federal oversight regarding the Doctrine's administration on the state 
level and the increasing range of its protections. This Note will then 
provide an overview of the judicial decisions supporting the applica-
tion of the peculiar provisions of the Ordinance to the common-
wealth's ocean flats as well as its great ponds,31 another trust resource 
addressed by the law. Part II lays the framework for an examination of 
the validity of applying this ancient statute to the flats of Nantucket 
and Martha's Vineyard by examining the islands' unique history and 
economic developmen ts in relation to the rest of colonial Massachu-
27 See Charter ofW. & M., 1691, U.K.-Mass. Bay Colony. 
28 Barbara A. Vestal, Dueling with Boat Oars, Dragging Through Mooring Lines: Time for 
More Formal Resolution of Use Conflicts in States Coastal Waters ~ 4 OCEAN & COASTAL LJ. 1, 25 
n.84 (1999). 
29 See Gautam, supra note 22, at 19-23. 
30 SeeShivelyv. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1894); see, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 313 
N.E.2d 561, 566 (1974). 
31 Great ponds in Massachusetts are defined as "ponds containing in their natural state 
more than ten acres ofland." MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 91, § 35 (2002). 
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setts at the time the Ordinance was enacted, as well as their curren t 
economic realities. 
Part ill then applies SJC precedent regarding property rights in 
trust resources, the current federal framework regarding the Doctrine's 
administration on the state level, as well as the traditional purpose and 
expanding scope of this ancient canon regarding property rights, to the 
application ofthe Ordinance to the beaches of Nantucket and Martha's 
Vineyard today. Applying the factors discussed in Parts I and II, Part ill 
argues that the present application of this colonial statute to Nantucket 
and Martha's Vineyard has resulted in an unnecessary violation of both 
the letter and spirit of the Doctrine on the islands. It asserts that this 
violation arises from both the SJC's inconsistent rulings regarding the 
applicability of the Ordinance to the commonwealth's trust resources, 
and inappropriate judicial usurpation of the authority to define public 
rights protected under the Doctrine. This Note will demonstrate that 
this misapplication is based on a fundamental misunderstanding re-
garding the flexible nature of the Doctrine that allowed for its common 
law modification in the seventeenth century. Lastly, although it will not 
prescribe the precise method by which to reestablish the correct bal-
ance of trust interests on the islands, this Note will nevertheless assert 
that the state legislature is well within its authority to further modifY the 
Doctrine as applied to the beaches of Nantucket and Martha's Vineyard 
in order to reclaim the flats along their coastlines. Although such a 
modification would not permit the public to enjoy the sands of these 
beaches above the high-tide line, it would be a substan tial victory in the 
fight to reclaim the public's trust rights in the flats on the islands con-
sistent with the law's true intent. 
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I. ANCIENT ORIGINS, ENGLISH COMMON LAW DEVELOPMENTS, AND 
ApPLICA TION OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO THE 
NEW WORLD AND POST-COLONIAL AMERICA 
A. The Ancient Roots of the Public Trust Doctrine 
Thus, the following things are by natural law common to all-the air, 
running watn; the sea, and consequently the sea-shore. No one therefore is 
forbidden access to the sea-shore . .. for these are not, like the sea itself, sub-
ject to the law of nations . ... [These] cannot be said to belong to anyone 
as p1ivate property. 
-Justin ian 32 
So wrote Justinian approximately 1500 years ago in what is likely 
the first articulation of the public trust doctrine.33 Throughout history, 
the shorelines have been recognized as a special form of property, of 
inherent value to the public at large, which has certain vested rights to 
make use of this resource for fishing, fowling, navigation, and various 
other activities central to human existence.34 Since Roman society was 
heavily dependent on the sea for commerce and sustenance, access to 
beaches was considered indispensable to one's livelihood.35 Therefore, 
"the Romans adopted and refined the Greek notion that marine re-
sources were exempt from private property ownership," leading to the 
codification ofthe concept in the Institutes ofJustinian.36 
B. English Common Law Developments in the Public TTllst Doctrine 
With the fall of the Roman Empire came a corresponding disre-
gard of the tenets of the Doctrine.37 Consequently, shorelines fell into 
the hands of private owners as Europe descended into the Dark 
Ages.3s In medieval England, the King claimed ownership of all ma-
rine resources, and private rights thereto were sold to individual sub-
jects.39 By the end of the twelfth century, however, the public became 
32 J. INST. 2.1.1. 
33 Frank Langella. Note, Public Access to New York and New Jersey Beaches: Has Either State 
Adequately Fulfilled Its Responsibilities as Trustees Under the Public Trust Doctriner, 44 N .Y.L. SCH. 
L. REV. 179. 182 (2000). 
34 See Fernandez, supra note II, at 626--27. 
35 SeeJ. IN ST. 2.1.1; see also Lahey, supra note 14, at 11-2. 
36 Lahey, supra note 14, at 11-2. 
37 See id. 
38 Id. 
39Id. 
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dissatisfied with the English system of feudal land ownership.40 In re-
sponding to this situation, the Magna Carta "restored some of the 
public's rights in tidelands," and the tenets of the Doctrine re-
emerged as trust rights were once again recognized as a protectable 
public property interest.41 From this point on, title to public trust 
land, jus privatum, "was held by the King, while dominion over the 
lands, jus publicum, was vested in the Crown in trust for the benefit of 
the public."42 Jus privatum comprises the lesser title to trust lands en-
compassing the right of the sovereign to alienate them subject to the 
public's inherent jus publicum rights.43 Jus publicum consists of the 
dominant title and protects the public's right to access and use trust 
lands for activities such as navigation, commerce, and fishing.44 The 
Doctrine subsequently appeared in the writings of Bracton, was indoc-
trinated into the English common law system, and is incorporated as a 
staple of property law in modern America.45 
C. Development oj the Public Tmst Doct'line in the United States 
1. Massachusetts 
a. Colonial Development 
In the seventeenth century, the first English settlers of present-
day Massachusetts established the colonies of Plymollth and Massa-
chusetts Bay, bringing with them the basic common law tenets of the 
English legal system, including those regarding the Doctrine.46 In fact, 
Massachusetts Bay Colony was the first American en tity to codify this 
law with the passage of the Colonial Ordinance of 1641-47 (the Or-
dinance).47 This statute, however, provided for private ownership of 
shoreline property down to the low-water mark in the settlement, and 
in this manner modified the traditional common law regarding prop-
4°Id. 
41 Lahey, supra note 14, at 11-2; see Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S. 367, 410 (1842) 
(citing English common law precedent and reasoning that, since the Magna Carta, the 
king could not alienate trust lands to individual subjects). 
42 See Langella, supra note 33, at 182. 
43 Id. at 183. 
HId. 
45 See id. at 182-83. 
46 See Storer v. Freeman, 6 Mass. (5 Tyng) 435, 438 (1810); see alw Lahey, supra note l4, 
at 11-2, 11-2-1. 
47 See id. 
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erty rights in the ocean flats.48 Specifically, the Ordinance was de-
signed to "encourage private wharf construction and maritime com-
merce in light of the colony's inability to afford these undertakings. "49 
Thus, it "created an exception to the application of the common law 
to satisfY a particular public need of a temporal nature," based on "the 
expectation of a public benefit to be derived from the developmen t of 
the flats for navigation and commerce. "50 
Nevertheless, since use of marine resources was still considered 
essential to human existence, this statute continued to protect the 
public's right to engage in activities associated with fishing, fowling, 
and navigation along the coast and the shorelines of the colony's 
great ponds.51 It states in part that "[e]ver[y] ... householder [s]hall 
have free fi[s]hing and fowling, in any great Ponds, Bay[]s, Coves and 
Rivers [s]o far as the Sea eb[b]s and flows, within the precincts of the 
town where thy dwell. "52 
b. Post-Colonial Developments 
The Ordinance was annulled with the rest of the Massachusetts 
Charter after the Revolutionary War. It remained the common law 
under the new state government,53 however, and is now loosely 
codified in chapter 91 of the Massachusetts General Laws,54 the com-
monwealth's statutory codification of the Doctrine.55 Nevertheless, it 
is important to note that the SJC has held that "the Commonwealth's 
authority and obligations under Chapter 91 are not precisely coexten-
sive with its authority under the [Doctrine],"56 and the trust rights in 
48 Fernandez, supra note II, at 631-32. 
49 Lahey, supra note 14, at 11-2-1; see Storer, 6 Mass. (5 Tyng) at 438. 
50 Fernandez, supra note II, at 631-32. 
51 See COLONIAL ORDINANCE, supra note 7, at 35; Fernandez, supra note II, at 631-32. 
52 See COLONIAL ORDINANCE, supra note 7, at 35; Fernandez, supra note 11, at 631-32. 
53 See Fernandez, supra note 11, at 632 (citing Storer, 6 Mass. (5 Tyng) at 438). 
54 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 91, §§ 1-2, 14, 18 (2002); Fafard v. Barnstable Conservation 
Comm'n, 733 N.E.2d 66, 71 n.ll (Mass. 2000) (citing Denise J. Dion Goodwin, Massachu-
setts' Chapter 91: An Effective Model For Statestewardship of Coastal Lands, 5 OCEAN & COASTAL 
LJ. 45, 45 (2000». 
55 Donald D. Cooper, In Recreation We Trust: The Public Trust Doctrine After Fafard, Bos-
TIlN BJ., Sept.-Oct. 2001, at 8,24. 
56 Fafard, 733 N.E.2d at 71 n.ll. Chapter 91 of the Massachusetts General Laws seeks 
"to strike a balance between the general rights of the public in fishing, fowling and naviga-
tion and the reasonable expectations of the landowners." Cooper, supra note 55, at 24. The 
statute requires that the commonwealth "act to preserve and protect the rights in tidelands 
of the inhabitants of the commonwealth by ensuring that the tidelands are utilized only for 
water-dependent uses or otherwise serve a proper public purpose." MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ch. 91, § 2. 
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Massachusetts have largely evolved through judicial common law in-
terpretations rather than legislative action.57 
2. Federal Oversight of the Public Trust Doctrine 
Consistent with colonial adoption of the English common law sys-
tem, stewardship of public trust rights passed from the Crown to the 
sovereigns of the new nation after the colonies won their independ-
ence.58 Due to the dual-sovereignty framework of the newly formed na-
tion, however, the Doctrine was defined differently for the states than 
for the federal government.59 States retain a somewhat qualified role of 
sovereign over trust lands, and various jurisdictions administer the Doc-
trine in differing ways, according to their specific parochial needs.5O It 
is the federal government, however, that acts as the ultimate trustee 
over the nation's unique resources. It therefore retains the authority to 
oversee the Doctrine's administration on the state level in order to en-
sure the protection of the public's jus publicum rights.61 
In Illinois Centml Railroad Co. v. Illinois, the Supreme Court ad-
dressed this federal oversight and clearly imposed upon states a 
57 See generally Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d. 561 (Mass. 1974) (relying on centu-
ries old judicial precedent when determining what rights are protected under the Ordi-
nance and Massachusetts's common law regarding the Doctrine). 
58 See Langella, supra note 33, at 183. 
59Id. 
60 See id. 
6) See id. at 183-84. The federal government's authority under the Doctrine was first 
articulated by the Supreme Court in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824), in which the Court 
emphasized the importance of maintaining exclusive federal control over regulating the 
nation's waterways to facilitate commerce; this federal power became known as the federal 
navigation servitude. Langella, supra note 33, at 183; Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Concep-
tions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Q:!testioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 
IOWA L. REV. 631, 637 (1986). Approximately twenty years later, in Martin v. Waddell's Les-
see, the Court ruled that the thirteen original colonies held title to the navigable waters 
and shores subject to these limited federal servitudes. 41 U.S. 367, 417 (1842); John A. 
Duff & Kristen M. Fletcher, AUg'7nenting the Public Trust: The Secretary of State's Efforts to Create 
a Public Trust Ecosystem Regime in Mississippi, 67 MISS. LJ. 645,648-49 (1998). Shortly after 
this decision, the Court held that new states entering the Union would do so on an ·'equal 
footing'· and would therefore take title to the tidelands and navigable waters within their 
borders. Duff & Fletcher, supra at 649 (citing Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 222 
(1845». In 1894 the Court affirmed the states' titles to trust land, indicating that they 
·'have the same rights as the original states in the tide waters, and in the lands below the 
high-water mark, within their respective jurisdictions. ,. Id. (quoting Shively v. Bowlby, 152 
U.S. 1, 26 (1894». 
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fiduciary duty to protect the public's vested interest in trust lands.62 
According to the majority: 
The con trol of the state for the purposes of the trust can 
never be lost, except as to such parcels as are used in pro-
moting the interests of the public therein, or can be dis-
posed of without any substantial impairment of the public 
interest in the lands and waters remaining.63 
The Court further reasoned that, under the Doctrine, if societal con-
ditions change to such an extent that a previously valid alienation of 
trust lands subsequently becomes counterproductive to the public's 
overall jus publicum interests, such legislative grants may be revoked.64 
Consequently, in this case the Court upheld the State Legisla-
hue's repeal of a previous gran t of a fee in terest to the Illinois Cen tral 
Railroad made in 1851, originally meant to facilitate railroad con-
struction on trust lands surrounding Chicago's waterfront.65 The ma-
jority reasoned that this transfer had evolved into a situation in which 
a private entity received an economic advantage arising from its own-
ership of trust lands, the public's right to these lands was impaired, 
and there was no overall benefit conferred upon society that would 
outweigh this imbalance.66 Considering the immense commercial 
value of the land in question, the Court concluded that such an ex-
tensive grant to a private railroad was "a proposition that [could not] 
be defended," and was therefore revocable.67 
Nevertheless, in Appleby v. City of New York, the Court affirmed the 
authority of state legislatures to alienate both the jus privitum title to 
trust lands, as well as the public's jus publicum interest in these re-
sources in certain limited cases.68 The majority held, however, that 
62 See Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 V.S. 387, 453-56 (1892); Kristen Hoffman, Note, 
Waterfront Redevelopment as an Urban Revitalization Tool: Boston's Waterfront Redevelopment Plan, 
23 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 471, 485-86 (1999). 
63 Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 V.S. at 453. 
64 Id. at 455; Hoffman, supra note 62, at 486. 
65 See Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 V.S. at 460-64; Hoffman, supra note 62, at 485-86. 
66 See Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 V.S. at 453-55. 
67 Id. at 454. 
68 See Appleby v. City of New York, 271 V.S. 364, 393-99 (1926); Hoffman, supra note 
62, at 486. The controversy in this case arose over state legislative grants of trust lands to 
New York City which were subsequently alienated to a private party. Applefly, 271 V.S. at 
367-68. This suit was brought by the owner of the land to restrain the city from using the 
water over this land for slips and mooring places for vessels. Id. at 372-73. The Court held 
that the city had consciously recognized and parted with both the jus publicum and the jus 
privatum titles in this land. Id. at 399; Hoffman, supra note 62, at 486. The Justices reasoned 
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such a transfer may only be executed if the state legislature 
affirmatively recognizes the public interests in the land, consciously 
intends to terminate such rights, and does so for a valid purpose.69 
More recently, as society has evolved and its priorities have shifted, 
the scope of trust activities has begun to expand in the United States. 
In addition to the traditional activities of fishing, fowling, and naviga-
tion, recreation is now emerging as a protected use of trust land in 
many states.70 The Court has followed this lead, and in Phillips Petroleum 
Co. v. Mississippi it upheld a broad interpretation of state law regarding 
rights protected by the Doctrine, indicating that they may extend to, 
among other activities, "bathing, swimming, and recreation."71 
D. Judicial Application of the Ordinance to Massachusetts 
In Massachusetts, controversy surrounding the applicability of 
the peculiar, time-specific exceptions to the common law embodied in 
the Ordinance to lands outside the area initially contemplated by this 
statute-those regions outside the original boundaries of Massachu-
setts Bay Colony proper-began in the early nineteenth centltry.72 
The SJC, however, has rendered inconsistent decisions in resolving 
these disputes. For instance, although judicial interpretations of the 
Ordinance as applied to the ocean flats have, on their face, remained 
faithful to this colonial statute and its relatively broad interpretation 
of the public's trust rights,73 they have nevertheless violated the over-
all in ten t of this law, and thus the Doctrine itself.74 They have gradu-
ally eroded the public's jus publicum rights by subtly elevating jus privi-
that the extensive grant to New York City and its subsequent alienation to a private party 
was valid since it was executed for the promotion of the commercial prosperity of the city, 
and consequently of the people of the state. Applefly, 271 U.S. at 393-99. 
69 See A.pplefly, 271 U.S. at 399; Hoffman, sttpra note 62, at 486. 
70 Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971) (indicating that protected trust uses 
include "the right to fish, hunt, bathe, swim, ... boat[] and [engage in] general recrea-
tion"); Kootenai Envtl. Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc. 671 P.2d 1085, 1088 
(Idaho 1983) (indicating that the Doctrine is a "dynamic ... concept ... destined to ex-
pand with the development and recognition of new public uses"); Borough of Neptune 
Cityv. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47,54 (NJ. 1972) (stating that the scope of 
the Doctrine is expanding to include bathing, swimming and other shore activities in or-
der "to meet changing conditions and needs of the public it was created to benefit"); Ves-
tal, supra note 28, at 25 n.84 (1999); Williams, supra note 21, at 24. 
71 See 484 U.S. 469, 482 (1998). 
72 See Storer v. Freeman, 6 Mass. (5 Tyng) 435,438 (1810). 
73 See, e.g, Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 65 (1851); Sharon M.P. 
Nichols, Note, Public Right of Passage Along the Massachusetts Coast: An Argument for Implemen-
tation Without C01Ttpensation, 4 B.U. PUB. INT. LJ. 113, 118-19 (1994). 
74 See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d 561, 568 (Mass. 1974). 
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tum interests as the dominant legal concern.75 This is particularly per-
plexing considering the SJC's more flexible and pragmatic interpreta-
tion of the Ordinance as it applies to the commonwealth's great 
ponds, or "those inland bodies of water of more than ten acres cre-
ated by a natural formulation of the land. "76 
1. Privately Owned Ocean-Fron t Flats in Massachusetts 
In Storer v. Freeman, the SJC held that the Plymouth Colony's 
modification of the common law concerning the Doctrine, via the Or-
dinance, was a valid method by which to facilitate commerce as the co-
lonial government did not have the funds necessary to build wharves 
absent private development.77 The decision indicated that the Ordi-
nance's provisions were now embedded as the common law of Massa-
chusetts.7s The opinion reasoned that, "[t]his ordinance was annulled 
with the charter by the authority of which it was made; but, from that 
time to the presen t, a usage has prevailed, which now has force as our 
common law, that the owner of lands bounded on the sea or salt water 
shall hold to the low water mark .... "79 Forty years later, the SJC 
reaffirmed this holding in Commonwealth v. Alger, stating that the Ordi-
nance was the settled law of Massachusetts.so The same year, in Weston v. 
Sampson, the court indicated that the provisions of the Ordinance now 
extended to Massachusetts tidelands regardless of whether they were 
"under other territorial governments at the time the colony ordinance 
was passed. "SI 
Exercising the federal fiduciary duty as the ultimate trustee of 
trust resources, the Supreme Court addressed the Commonwealth's 
application of the Ordinance in Shivley v. Bowlby.s2 The decision indi-
cated that the time- and place-specific modification of common law 
embodied in the Ordinance was now the established common law of 
Massachusetts.83 Specifically, the majority reasoned that the common-
75 See, e.g., id; Nichols, supra note 73, at 115. 
76 See, e.g., Lynnfield v. Peabody, 106 N.E. 977, 984-85 (Mass. 1914);John A. Pike, Wet-
lands and Waterways, in 2 MASS. CONHNUING LEGAL EDUC., REAL ESTATE TITLE PRACHCE 
IN MASSACHUSETrS 15-1, 15-6-1 (2003) (citing M. FRANKEL, LAW OF SEASHORE, WATERS, 
AND WATER COURSES: MAINE AND MASSACHUSETrS 110-11 (1969». 
776 Mass. (5 Tyng) at 438. 
78 See id. 
79 [d. 
80 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 77 (1851). 
81 62 Mass. (8 Cush.) 347,354 (1851). 
82 See 152 U.S. 1, 15-19 (1894). 
83 See id. at 19. 
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wealth's original colonial charters included the islands of Nantucket 
and Martha's Vineyard, and therefore the principles of the Ordinance 
had "been adopted and practiced" on the islands since their union 
with the Massachusetts Colony in 1692.84 
Although employing strict interpretations as to the applicability 
of the Ordinance to those parts of the commonwealth annexed after 
the passage of this statute, the courts continued to interpret the activi-
ties protected by the law relatively broadly. For instance, the public 
was still vested with certain usage rights in trust lands if engaged in 
fishing, fowling, or navigation, as well as watering cows, bathing, or 
engaging in other activities inherent to the public use and enjoyment 
of these resources.85 In addition, while the majority in Alger held that 
navigation and fishing in and over the tidelands were the p1incipal 
rights protected by the Ordinance, it nevertheless hinted that they 
were perhaps not the only trust interests covered by this law.86 Despite 
the court's indication of the law's potential flexibility, the opinion did 
not address what additional uses might be protected by the law.s7 
In 1907, the SJC shifted its emphasis away from protecting jus Jnt~ 
liC/un rights by both solidifYing the state legislature's (General Court's) 
authority over trust lands and severely curtailing the scope of activities 
protected by the Ordinance-an inconsistent holding. In Butler v. At-
torney General, the court presumed to hold that the principal public uses 
covered under the Ordinance articulated in Alger were the exclusive 
trust interests covered by the law.88 The majority held that the Ordi-
nance embodied "the local law as to jllS privatum, which in England is 
represented by the crown, and the jus publicum, which is there repre-
sen ted by the Parliamen t, both of which in this coun try are subject to 
the exercise oflegislative power."89 Although affirming the legislature's 
authority to determine trust rights by validating the provisions of the 
Ordinance, the majority limited their applicability to activities reasona-
bly related to "bathing, fishing, fowling, and navigation. "90 
&I [d. at 18-19. 
80 See Commonwealth v. Charlestown, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 180, 188-89 (1822); Nichols, 
supra note 73, at 118. Furthermore, in 1871, the court held that the public's usage rights in 
the flats included ·'fishing and fowling and other uses ... common to all.'" Nichols, supm 
note 73, at 118 (citing Paine v. Woods, 108 Mass. 160, 169 (1871)). 
B6 See Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) at 65; Nichols, supm note 73, at 118. 
87 See Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) at 65. 
88 See 80 N.E. 688, 689 (Mass. 1907); Fernandez, supm note II, at 633; Nichols, supm 
note 73, at 118-19. 
89 Butler, 80 N.E. at 689 (emphasis added). 
90 See id. at 688; Fernandez, supra note II, at 633. 
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Such precedent led to the SJC's somewhat circular analysis in a 
1974 opinion reviewing a legislative bill calling for a public right of 
on-foot passage along the shoreline flats of Massachusetts during day-
light hours.91 The majority rejected the notion that the Ordinance 
conferred upon the legislature the right to allow all significant public 
uses in the seashore, indicating that it had historically declared the 
public's rights in these lands to be limited in nature.92 Specifically, the 
majority explained that "the colonial ordinance has never been inter-
preted to provide the littoral owners only such uncertain and ephem-
eral rights as would result from such an interpretation. "93 The court 
reasoned that allowing public use of the flats for activities other than 
"natural derivative [s]" of those specifically protected by the Ordi-
nance would constitute a "wholesale denial of an owner's right to ex-
clude the public. "94 In effect, the court once again solidified the legis-
lature's authority to define trust interests by affirming the Ordinance, 
but denied the General Court the authority to further modifY these 
rights.95 Similar cases throughout the last 20 years have adhered to 
this rigid interpretation and application of the Ordinance to all ocean 
tidelands in the commonwealth.96 
2. The Ordinance and the Commonwealth's Great Ponds 
The SJC's almost pathological affinity for the strict tenets of the 
Ordinance seems to disappear in other contexts, such as the court's 
decisions concerning the commonwealth's great ponds. For example, 
in Inhabitants of West Roxbury v. Stoddard, the SJC indicated that the 
purpose of the statute was "to declare a great principle of public 
right," and therefore need not be strictly applied to all private grants 
of trust lands in the Massachusetts Bay Colony executed before the 
law was enacted.97 In addition, in Watuppa Reservoir Co. v. Fall River, 
91 Opinion of the Justices. 313 N.E.2d 561. 563-65 (Mass. 1974). 
92 Id. at 566-67. 
93 Id. at 567. 
94 Id. at 566. 568. 
95 See id. 
96 See. e.g .• Pazolt v. Dir. of the Div. of Me. Fisheries. 631 N.E.2d 547. 548 (Mass. 1994) 
(holding that shellfish cultivation is not a "natural derivative" of fishing. and therefore was 
not protected by the Ordinance. allowing the private owner to prohibit this activity on the 
flats); Wellfleet v. Glaze. 525 N.E.2d 1298. 1301 (Mass. 1988) (noting that "there is no gen-
eral right in the public to pass over the land or to use it for bathing purposes"); Fernan-
dez. supra note 11. at 652-53. 
97 See 89 Mass. (7 Allen) 158.165 (1863). In this case. however. the court held that the 
Ordinance did in fact control. even though the land grant in question was executed in 
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the court addressed the issue of whether the Ordinance applied to 
land held in another territorial jurisdiction-in this case Plymouth 
Colony-at the time the statute was passed.98 Justice Holmes found no 
concrete evidence that this statute was the law in the neighboring col-
ony before it merged with Massachusetts Bay.99 Although conceding 
that the Ordinance became part of Plymouth's common law after it 
merged with the Massachusetts Bay Colony, he reasoned that "such an 
extension does not necessitate a fiction that the law has been so always 
which would be unreasonable as a change of private rights in the 
guise of a declaratory statute. "100 The opinion further expressed skep-
ticism as to whether the Ordinance was even practiced in Plymouth 
after this annexation. lOl 
Furthermore, in Lynnfield v. Peabody, the court reasoned that be-
fore the Ordinance was in force, the common law provided that great 
ponds were not in fact public property and could be given or sold to 
private persons.102 Therefore, contrary to the SJC's holdings in cases 
regarding the ocean flats, the court held that so long as title to the 
property was validly obtained, an owner's rights to these trust lands 
would be subject to traditional interpretations of the common law, not-
withstanding the provisions of the Ordinance.103 In addition, the Mas-
sachusetts judiciary interprets the public's trust rights in these lands 
more broadly than merely applying to fishing, fowling, and navigation. 
Rather, they look to the actual intent of the law and have included boat-
ing, bathing, and even skating as protected uses under the Ordi-
nance.104 
1636. Id. at 168-69. As the grant was made to Roxbury, the court held that the legislature 
could require towns to devote these lands to public purposes. Id. at 170. 
98 28 N.E. 257, 257-58 (Mass. 1891). 
99 See id. 
100 Id. at 258. 
101Id. 
102 See 106 N.E. 977, 984-85 (Mass. 1914). This case involved a dispute between the 
town of Peabody and the residents of Lynnfield over the ownership of Humphry Pond. Id. 
at 979. Lynnfield residents, as successors in interest to the owner who had gained title from 
the original private owner prior to the passage of the Ordinance, brought suit against Pea-
body for damages and lost value due to its extraction of water. Id. Peabody's defense as-
serted that the grant was invalid because it contradicted the provisions of the Ordinance. 
Id. The court held that plaintiffs could recover damages as private owners of the property. 
Id. 
103 See id. at 984-85. 
104 Seeinhabitants ofW. Roxbury v. Stoddard, 89 Mass. (7 Allen) 158, 171 (1863); Pike, 
supra note 76, at 15-6-1 (citing M. FRANKEL, LAW OF SEASHORE, WATERS, AND WATER 
COURSES: MAINE AND MASSACHUSETTS 1l0-1l (1969)). 
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n. THE ISLANDS OF NANTUCKET AND MARTHA'S VINEYARD IN THE 
MASSACHUSETTS FRAMEWORK 
A. The Independent Political History of Nantucket and Martha's Vineyard 
They sailed into a fiith; there lay an island before it, round which there 
were strong currents, therefore called they it Stream island. 
-Thorfinn Karlsefnel05 
Outside of hints found in Nordic lore,106 no records indicate any 
great European interest in the islands of Nantucket or Martha's Vine-
yard before the seventeenth century.107 In 1621, King James I of Eng-
land reorganized the Plymouth Company under the name the Coun-
cil for the Mfaires of New England. los Although the colonies of 
Plymouth and Massachusetts Bay were settled pursuant to patents and 
charters obtained through the Council, the islands most likely re-
mained uninhabited because "[t]he savage was then too much of a 
problem for them to try the experimen t of isolating themselves on an 
island populated with them, and thus be out of the reach of help in 
time of hostile attacks. "109 As a result, settlers sought new homes in the 
more populated areas along the coast of Massachusetts. llo 
In 1635, King James's successor, Charles I, urged the Council to 
convey land grants of present-day New York, including the islands of 
Nantucket and Martha's Vineyard, to William, Earl of Stirling, Secre-
tary of State of Scotland.1ll Having reached the limit of its usefulness, 
however, the Counsel surrendered its charter to King Charles 1.112 He, 
in turn, granted a charter to Sir Fernando Gorges on April 3, 1639, 
"providing him undoubted sovereign rights over Martha's Vineyard 
105 See CHARLES EDWARD BANKS, 1 THE HISTORY OF MARTItA'S VINEYARD, DUKES 
COUNTY, MASSACHUSETrS 58 (Edgartown, Dukes County Historical Soc'y 1966) (1911) 
(quoting a Norse saga purportedly describing present-day Martha's Vineyard). 
106 [d. at 58-59. The island "round which there were strong currents" was christened 
with the name Straumey, or the stream island, due to "that peculiar co-tidal phenomenon 
which impressed all the early voyagers sailing into these waters." [d. This depiction has led 
some historical scholars to assert that these early Norsemen were in fact describing what 
would later become known as the island of Martha's Vineyard. See id. at 58. 
107 [d. at 58-59; LYDIA S. HINCHMAN, EARLY SETTLERS OF NANTIJCKET, ThEIR AsSOCI-
ATES AND DESCENDANTS 1 (Charles E. Tuttle Co. 1980) (1896). 
108 ALEXANDER STARBUCK, ThE HISTORY OF NANTIJCKET COUNTY, ISLAND, AND TOWN, 
INCLUDING GENEALOGIES OF FIRST SETTLERS 13 (Charles E. Tuttle Co. 1983) (1924). 
109 See BANKS, supra note 105, at 71. 
110 [d. 
JII STARBUCK, supra note 108, at 13. 
112 BANKS, supra note 105, at 71-72. 
448 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 31:431 
and Nantucket," although Lord Stirling continued to assert that he 
held a proprietary in terest in the islands.113 In 1641, Thomas Mayhew 
secured titles from both in terests in an attempt to establish settle-
ments on the islands.1l4 
In 1643, the colonies of Massachusetts Bay, Plymouth, Connecti-
cut, and New Haven formed a mutual security alliance known as the 
Commission of the United Colonies of New England. ll5 In 1644, the 
Commissioners authorized Massachusetts to bring the Vineyard under 
its jurisdiction, if it so chose.1l6 This annexation was not executed;ll7 
in fact, in 1654, the Massachusetts Bay Colony legislature specifically 
voted that the region was not within its jurisdiction.lls Therefore, 
Mayhew's island kingdom off the coast of Cape Cod remained what it 
had been up until this point, namely an "independent, self-governing" 
entity belonging to no chartered province as the concept was then 
understood.119 
On March 12, 1664, Charles II granted the Patent of New York, 
Maine, and Long Island, as well as Nantucket and Martha's Vineyard, to 
James, Duke ofYork.120 Pursuant to his authority as provincial governor 
of New York, Francis Lovelace affirmed the titles of the islands' inhabi-
tants in 1671, granting them "all ye lands, soyles, woods, meadows, pas-
tures, marches, waters, []fishing, hawking, hunting, and []fouling. "121 
In 1684, Governor Thomas Dongan affirmed the Lovelace grants with a 
more specific grant bestowing the "Trustees" of the islands with rights 
in "all the lakes, ponds, brookes, streams, [and] beaches."122 
In 1673, New York was taken by the Dutch, leading to dissent on 
the Vineyard as to whether the island's inhabitants would pledge their 
allegiance to the Dutch or Massachusetts authorities.123 Responding to 
these concerns, the Massachusetts authorities determined that they 
could not find "'sufficient re[alson ... to take upon us the Governrn't oj any 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 80-83; C.G. HINE, THE SWRY OF MARTHA'S VINEYARD 6 (1908). 
115 See THE FORME OF THE COMISSION W BE GRANTED W THE COMISSIONRS FOR THE 
UNITED COLONIES (1644), reprinted in 2 RECORDS OF 'mE GOVERNOR & COMPANY OF THE 
MASSACHUSETIS BAY IN NEW ENGLAND 69 (Nathaniel B. Shurtleff ed., 1853). 
116 BANKS, supra note 105, at 132. 
117 Id. at 132. 
118 H INE, supra note 114, at 7. 
119 BANKS, supra note 105, at 132 (emphasis added). 
120 Id. at 139. 
121 FRANKLIN B. HOUGH, PAPERS RELATING TO THE ISLAND OF NANTUCKET 129-31 
(1856). 
122 Id. at 133-35. 
123 BANKS, supra note 105, at 154-55. 
2004) The Shoreline Public Trust (m Nantucket and Martha's Vineyard 449 
people upon the request oj a part oj them, '" indicating once again that this 
region was beyond their jurisdiction.124 
In February 1674, the Treaty of Nieuw Amsterdam was executed 
between the English and the Dutch, firmly reestablishing Nantucket 
and Martha's Vineyard under the jurisdiction of the Colony of New 
York.125 In 1683, the Provincial Assembly of New York divided the prov-
ince into several counties including "the Islands of Nantucket ... 
[and] Mart[]ha's Vineyard," consolidating the islands in a county or-
ganization within the province of New York.126 
Yet another transfer was made in 1691, and pursuant to the Char-
ter of William and Mary, the Plymouth and Massachusetts Bay Colo-
nies were combined, the islands were detached from New York, and 
all were consolidated under the authority of the Massachusetts gov-
ernment.127 In order to solidifY this transfer, the General Court 
quickly passed the Act for the Confirmation of Titles within the Is-
lands of Capawock, alias Martha's Vineyard and Nantucket. 128 This 
resolution provided: 
That all lands, tenements, hereditaments and other estates, 
held and enjoyed by any person or persons, towns or villages 
within the said islands of ... Martha's Vineyard and Nan-
tucket . . . by or under any gran t or estate duly made or 
granted by any former government, or by the successive gov-
ern ours of New York, or any other lawful right or title what-
soever, shall be, by such person or persons, towns or villages, 
their respective heirs, successors and assigns, forever hereaf-
ter held and enjoyed according to the tme purport and intent oj 
such respective gr[alnt . ... 129 
Nantucket and Martha's Vineyard thus became firmly embedded 
within Massachusetts. 
124 See id. at 159 (quoting a Letter from The Court of Assistants, Mass., to Mr. Thomas 
Bercher, Mr. Isaac Robenson, and the Rest of the Subscribers of a Petition Sent From Mar-
tens Vineyard (Oct. 31,1673)) (emphasis added). 
125 Id. at 162-63. 
126 Id. at 258-59. 
127 See Charter of W. & M. 1691, U.K.-Mass. Bay Colony; STARBUCK, supra note 108, at 
77. 
128 STARBUCK, supra note 108, at 83. 
129 An Act for Confirmation of Titles Within the Islands of Capawock, Alias Martha's 
Vineyard and Nantucket, ch. 4 (1693) (codified at 1869 Mass. Acts 117-18) (emphasis 
added). 
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B. Economic Development of Nantucket and Martha's Vineyard 
[An island] so universally barren, and so unfit for civilization, that 
they mutually agreed not to divide it. 
-J. Hector St.John de Crevecoeur, French Surveyorl30 
1. A Distinct Society 
Mter obtaining grants of land from the Stirling and Gorges inter-
ests that included Nantucket and Martha's Vineyard,131 Thomas May-
hew turned his attention to developing these "as yet uninhabited" is-
lands. Mter receiving fair titles from the native inhabitants, he was 
"determined to ... start a new home, perhaps found a new colony, for 
[the islands] were situated without the lawful bounds of the territory of Mas-
sachusetts Bay. "132 Thereafter, Mayhew, his son, and a few associates took 
possession of the islands and "formed the vanguard of English settlers 
... under the laws of the Kingdom of England. "133 Mayhew, not Massa-
chusetts, exerted direct control over Martha's Vineyard and left Nan-
tucket to the control of its indigenous people.134 Local historians re-
count a cordial relationship between the English settlers and the 
Indians of the islands, and that a usage arose under which they shared 
the islands' resources in common, including coastal beaches.135 
2. Independent Commercial Development 
From its earliest settlements around the year 1649, shepherding 
drove the economy of Nantucket.136 By 1672 islanders began to turn 
to whaling as an additional source of revenue, and by 1712 the sperm 
whale was discovered off the coast; it subsequen tly became the island's 
chief commodity.137 From 1800 to 1840 the island earned the distinc-
tion of "Whaling Capital of the World. "138 By the 1850s, however, the 
130 J. HEC'IOR ST.JOHN DE CREVECOEUR, LETTERS FROM AN AMERICAN FARMER 92 (Ox-
ford Univ. Press 1997) (1782) (describing the Island of Nantucket in the eighteenth cen-
tury). 
131 BANKS. supra note 105. at 80--83; HINE, supra note 114, at 6. 
132 BANKS, supra note 105, at 80, 84 (emphasis added). 
133 [d. at 87. 
134 [d. at 258. 
135 See Interview, supra note 23. 
136 NAWruCKETCAPECOD.COM, NANTUCKET HISTIlRY PAGE, at http://www.nantuck-
etcapecod.com/history.html [hereinafter NANTUCKET HIs'IURVj (last visited Oct. 15,2003). 
137 See STARBUCK, supra note 108, at 354; NANTUCKET HISTORY, supra note 136. 
138 NAN'IUCKET HISTIlRY, supra note 136. 
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industry was in decline, the population of the island decreased rap-
idly, and Nantucket became an isolated community once more.139 
Similarly, the Vineyard was among the first of the colonies to make 
use of whaling as a commercial industry.14o Much like Nantucket, 
however, the whaling industry on Martha's Vineyard was on the wane 
by the end of the Civil War. 141 
3. The Rise of a New Commodity 
The death of whaling returned the islands of Nantucket and Mar-
tha's Vineyard to isolation.142 This relative obscurity, however, helped 
to retain the unique charm of the islands, and they have become at-
tractive tourist destinations today.143 Tourism is, in fact, a large driving 
force behind the economies of Nantucket and Martha's Vineyard.144 
During the summer mon ths the population of the islands more than 
doubles; this number continues to increase as the islands become ever 
more popular vacation destinations.145 Most tourism revenue is gener-
ated from eating and drinking establishments, hotels and other lodg-
ing places, amusement and recreational services, and museums.146 
Despite this booming industry, however, the average per capita earn-
ings on the islands are considerably lower than the statewide average, 
the cost of living is considerably higher than that of the rest of the 
region, and this gap continues to widen.147 
139 [d. 
140 BANKS, supra note 105, at 432. 
141 See VINEYARD GAZETTE ONLINE, A HIS'mRY OF MARTHA'S VINEYARD at http://www. 
mvgazette.com/travel/vineyard_hi~tory/ (last visited Oct. 15,2003). 
142 NANT1JCKET HISTORY, supra note 136. 
143 [d. The Vineyard was, however, a bit slower to take advantage of the tourist industry 
than Nantucket. It was not until the servicemen stationed on the island's airbase-which 
later became the county airport-returned home to their families after World War II that 
word of the island's unique charm began to spread. See VINEYARD GAZETTE ONLINE, supra 
note 141. 
144 See Gautam, supra note 22, at 19. 
145 [d. at 22. The number of annual visitors to Nantucket increased an estimated 29% 
from 1992 to 1997, and approximately 400,000 people visit the island each year. [d. Simi-
larly, the annual number of visitors to Martha's Vineyard has increased an estimated 21.5% 
to 2.1 million over the same period. [d. As a result, tourism accounts for 23.1 % of em-
ployment in this region. Sec id. 
146 See id. In 1997, the highest concentration of jobs in the region was in the private 
sector. [d. at 23. This represents 32% ofaB employment, of which most is in retail. [d. Eat-
ing and drinking establishments are the largest employers in the area, providing 11,689 
jobs and accounting for 13.2% of employment and 41 % of retail trade. [d. 
147 See id. at 22. 
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III. MISAPPLICATION OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE ON 
NANTUCKET AND MARTHA'S VINEYARD 
In the sense that the ancient Greeks and Romans considered the 
use of marine resources as essential to survival, the present applica-
tion of the Ordinance to the beaches of Nantucket and Martha's 
Vineyard is facially consistent with the ancient roots of trust rights.148 
Although providing for private ownership of the flats, the law still pro-
tects the public's rights of fishing, fowling, and navigation, activities 
considered essential to human existence at the time of enactrnent.149 
In addition, it remains at least nominally faithful to the current fed-
eral framework regarding the Doctrine as mandated by the Supreme 
Court. At the time the law was passed, the colonial authorities asserted 
that the economic benefits that would accrue to the entire settlement 
stemming from private developmen ts of the flats would outweigh the 
partial loss of the public's jus publicum rights in this resource. 150 In-
deed, both subsequent case law151 and the Commonwealth's modern 
codification of the Doctrine152 seem to follow these mandates: that the 
public's interest in these trust lands is explicitly recognized, and to 
terminate the public's interest, the legislature must consciously intend 
to do so, and have a valid purpose.153 
Upon closer examination, however, the application of the Ordi-
nance to the entirety of the commonwealth's flats, especially with re-
spect to Nantucket and Martha's Vineyard, seems to: (1) contradict 
SJC precedent regarding the Ordinance as it relates to property rights 
in the commonwealth's trust resources;154 (2) violate the federal 
guidelines regarding state administration of the Doctrine;155 and (3) 
contradict the overall spirit and intent of the Doctrine.156 Neverthe-
less, the courts have repeatedly held that the Ordinance is the estab-
lished common law in Massachusetts regarding its ocean flats. 157 
148 SeeJ. INST. 2.1.1; Lahey, supra note 14, at 11-2. 
149 See COLONIAL ORDINANCE, supra note 7, at 35. 
150 See Storer v. Freeman, 6 Mass. (5 Tyng) 435.438 (1810); Fernandez, supra note 11, 
at 631-32. 
151 See Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d 561, 567-68 (Mass. 1974). 
152 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 91, §§ 1-2 (2002). 
153 See Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364, 399 (1926). 
154 See, e.g., Lynnfield v. Peabody, 106 N.E. 977, 984-85 (Mass. 1914). 
155 See Appleffy, 271 U.S. at 393-99; Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453-56 
(1892). 
156 SeeJ. INST. 2.1.1. 
157 See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d 561, 566 (Mass. 1974). 
2004] The Shoreline Public Trust on Nantucket and Martha's Vineyard 453 
These decisions are based on inconsistent reasoning by the SJC 
and a fundamental misunderstanding of the judicial role in protect-
ing trust rights, as well as confusion over the Doctrine's inherent 
flexibility that gave rise to its modification in the seventeenth cen-
tury.158 The result is the misapplication of the Ordinance to the is-
lands today. Therefore, a further modification-or at least a more 
flexible in terpretation-of the common law regarding the Doctrine is 
perhaps in order, and under SJC precedent,159 federal mandate,160 
and emerging trends in other states,161 is permissible. 
A. The Violation of the Public Trust Doctrine on Nantucket and Martha's 
Vineyard 
1. Independent Trust Rights Vested in the Beaches of Nantucket and 
Martha's Vineyard 
Historical records clearly indicate that during most of the colo-
nial period the islands of Nantucket and Martha's Vineyard were "in-
dependent self-governing" entities that were largely ignored by early 
settlers.162 King Charles I initially granted the islands to William, Earl 
of Stirling in 1635, and then to Fernando Georges in 1639, never 
hinting that they were under the jurisdiction of the Massachusetts Bay 
Colony.163 In addition, under the grants of Charles II, they were em-
bedded within the jurisdiction of New York for the next three dec-
ades. 164 In fact, the Massachusetts Bay Colony declined to annex the 
region in 1644 and specifically voted against incorporation in 1654.165 
In 1671, Francis Lovelace, the provincial Governor of New York, 
affirmed the titles of the islands' inhabitants, and Thomas Dongan 
reaffirmed them in 1684.166 
Under the authority vested in him by the Province of New York, 
Thomas Mayhew governed the county that included the islands.167 It 
was not until 1691 that the islands were detached from their connec-
158 See COLONIAL ORDINANCE, supra note 7, at 35. 
159 See, e.g., Lynnfield, 106 N.E. at 984-85. 
160 See Appleby, 271 U.S. at 393-99; Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 453-56. 
161 See infra note 223. 
162 See BANKS, supra note 105, at 132. 
163 See BANKS, supra note 105, at 71-72, 80-83; HINE, supra note 114, at 6; STARBUCK, 
supra note 108, at 13. 
164 See BANKS, supra note 105, at 139. 
165 See BANKS, supra note 105, at 132; HINE, supra note 114, at 7. 
166 HOUGH, supra note 121, at 133-35. 
167 BANKS, supra note 105, at 258. 
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tion with New York and placed under the authority of the Massachu-
setts govern men t.168 In short, there are no historical records indicat-
ing even nominal political ties between the islands and the Massachu-
setts Bay Colony, nor any proprietary interests connecting them, 
during this period. 
As a result, until the 1691 union, the islands largely developed as 
distinct societies and were, in a sense, colonies unto themselves.169 In-
deed, records indicate that Thomas Mayhew was determined to estab-
lish "the vanguard of English settle[ment] ... under the laws of the 
Kingdom of England."170 Therefore, titles granted to private individu-
als were independent of the colonial laws of the Massachusetts Bay 
Colony and subject to the common law of that province. Due to this 
state of law, it is reasonable to assume that at least un til 1691, and 
likely well past this time, landowners held their oceanfront property 
pursuant to the "true purport and meaning"l7l of the grants con-
ferred upon them by New York authorities; under the traditional Eng-
lish common law tenets of the Doctrine, that did not provide for pri-
vate ownership ofthe flats.172 
In this context, the SJC's decisions regarding the common-
wealth's great ponds are illustrative. In West Roxbury v. Stoddard, the 
court indicated that land grants made to private parties before the 
passage of the Ordinance, even if within the bounds of the Massachu-
setts Bay Colony, need not be subject to its modification of the com-
mon law.173 Therefore, it would seem contradictory to apply this stat-
ute to the islands, which were transferred several years prior to this 
legislation .174 Further, as to lands gran ted to private parties in territo-
ries beyond the original bounds of this colony-the SJC's decisions 
regarding the flats notwithstanding-it is unlikely that either private 
beachfront owners, or the general public, automatically shifted use of 
these lands to conform to the Ordinance.175 Thus, applying this law to 
the beaches of Nantucket and Martha's Vineyard today "would be un-
reasonable as a change of private rights in the guise of a declaratory 
168 STARBUCK, supra note 108, at 77. 
169 BANKS, supra note 105, at 80. 
170 [d. at 87. 
171 See An Act for Confirmation of Titles Within the Islands of Capawock, A.lias Mar-
tha's Vineyard and Nantucket, ch. 4 (1693) (codified at 1869 Mass. Acts 117-18). 
172 See Langella, supra note 33, at 182-83. 
173 See 89 Mass. (7 Allen) 158,165 (1863). 
174 See id. 
175 SeeWatuppa Reservoir Co. v. Fall River, 28 N.E. 257, 257-58 (Mass. 1891). 
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statute, "176 although in this case the property rights affected would be 
the public's trust interests. 
Finally, as the grants made to the islanders by New York authori-
ties were valid, under Lynnfield v. Peabody, these lands should be sub-
ject to traditional in terpretations of the common law, including those 
regarding the Doctrine.177 This assertion finds support in the provi-
sions of the Act for the Confirmation of Titles because it provided 
that landowners continued to own property alienated before the con-
solidation of Massachusetts "according to the true purport and intent of 
such respective gr[aJnt[sJ. "178 Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that 
the fundamental property laws under which these lands were held, 
i.e., the traditional tenets of the Doctrine, remained intact, were part 
of the intent of early land transfers on the islands, and as such are in-
dependen tly vested in their beaches today.179 
2. The Legislature Must Recognize the Public's Trust Rights and 
Consciously In tend to Terminate Them 
Due to the unique circumstances surrounding the history of 
Nantucket and Martha's Vineyard, it may be argued that the Ordi-
nance does not apply to their beaches. Therefore, by definition, it 
would be impossible that Massachusetts authorities recognized the 
public's trust rights to these beaches and consciously intended to 
terminate them. Aside from an argument based on the historical 
technicalities involved in the transfers of these lands, however, the 
root of the Doctrine violation on Nantucket and Martha's Vineyard 
also stems from the judiciary's fundamental misunderstanding of its 
role in protecting trust rights. 
The application of the Doctrine under the dual sovereignty 
framework of the United States dictates that trust rights be defined 
differently from state to state, according to particular needs.l80 This 
framework seems to argue for deferen tial federal review of state judi-
cial and legislative determinations of trust rights.l 81 The Supreme 
Court's decisions in Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois and Appleby v. 
176 See id. 
177 Lynnfield v. Peabody, 106 N.E. 977, 984-85 (Mass. 1914). 
178 Sce An Act for Confirmation of Titles Within the Islands of Capawock, Alias Mar-
tha's Vineyard and Nantucket, ch. 4 (1693) (codified at 1869 Mass. Acts 117-18) (empha-
sis added). 
179 Sce Langella, supra note 33, at 182-83. 
180 [d. at 183. 
181 See id. 
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New York support this proposition, as the Court deferred to legislative 
determinations of states' trust interests.182 It is essential to note that in 
these cases, although the respective majorities endeavored to protect 
the trust interests of the public, they did not presume to define precisely 
what these rights were. l83 
In Massachusetts, however, the SJC defers to a nearly 400-year-old 
legislative determination ofthe public's trust rights, and indicates that 
the modern legislature is powerless to amend the Ordinance. By 
abridging the General Court's power in this fashion, the SJC has, in 
effect, usurped the commonwealth's role as sovereign over trust 
lands. The court has presumed to define the precise uses protected in 
Massachusetts's flats, rather than allowing the legislature-the proper 
arbiter of trust rights-to determine these rightS. 1M The SJC fails to 
see the forest for the trees by holding that the paramoun t considera-
tion is remaining faithful to the strict provisions of the Ordinance, as 
opposed to adhering to the overall intent of the law to use trust re-
sources to maximize the benefits they generate for the public. l85 
Although the SJC's decision in Commonwealth v. Alger came close to 
comporting with the true intent of the Doctrine, hinting that tradi-
tional trust activities were perhaps not the only interests covered by the 
Ordinance, the decision fell short because it did not address the ques-
tion of whether the common law could be further modified to meet the 
changing needs of societyYl(1 As a result, subsequent cases have contin-
ued to usurp the General Court's role of defining the public'S trust 
rights in Massachusetts by forbidding the legislature to update them in 
accordance with society's current trust needs. 187 The SJC has treated a 
unique modification of the Doctrine, arising from a legislative deter-
mination of the specific needs of a particular jurisdiction nearly 400 
years ago, as the final word regarding the scope of the public's trust 
needs in Massachusetts today. ISS Therefore, due to a judicial usurpation 
of the legislative authority to define the public's jus publicum rights, as 
well as a misinterpretation of a modification exhibiting the Doctrine's 
flexibility, the development of the public's trust rights has been stunted 
182 SeeApplebyv. New York, 271 U.S. 364,399 (1926); III. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 
387,453 (1892). 
183 Appleby, 271 U.S. at 393-99; Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 453-56. 
184 See, e.g., Butler v. Attorney Gen., 80 N.E. 688, 689 (Mass. 1907). 
185 See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d 561, 566-68 (Mass. 1974). 
186 See Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53,65 (1851). 
187 See, e.g., Opinion oftheJustices, 313 N.E.2d at 566-68. 
188 See id. 
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in Massachusetts, rendering it unable to meet the changing needs of 
society. 189 
It is true, however, that the judicial decisions establishing the 
foundations for the Doctrine's application in Massachusetts were ren-
dered before the Supreme Court's decisions on the subject,190 and it 
may be unreasonable to indiscriminately apply the current federal 
standards in hindsight.191 Even the decisions rendered after the Su-
preme Court's rulings, however, fail to acknowledge that the trust 
rights in properties outside the Massachusetts Bay Colony were per-
haps impaired by the blanket application of the Ordinance to all the 
flats of the modern commonwealth, indicating that this situation has 
possibly gone unnoticed by the courts.192 
3. Trust Rights May Only Be Extinguished for a Valid Purpose 
The benefits bestowed upon the general public by the 
modification of the common law via the Ordinance were confined to 
the residents of the Massachusetts Bay Colony.193 The greater Boston 
area was the center of commerce for the New England region during 
the colonial period, and this was the area originally contemplated by 
the law.194 The Doctrine's trustee ceded part of the general public's 
trust interests to private developers in order to stimulate the economy 
of the region.195 This modification to the common law, intended to 
benefit the citizens of the Massachusetts Bay Colony, would have be-
stowed little benefit upon the inhabitants of the islands and therefore 
was not a valid interpretation of the islanders' trust needs.196 
This proposition is supported by the early economic development 
of Nantucket and Martha's Vineyard. Initially, their economies were 
driven by whaling.197 As opposed to industrial and commercial devel-
opment, private development of the flats would hinder rather than fa-
189 See id. 
190 See, e.g., Storer v. Freeman, 6 Mass. (5 Tyng) 435 (1810). 
191 See Opinion of the justices, 313 N.E.2d at 566. 
192 See, e.g., id. at 566-68. 
193 See BANKS, supra note 105, at 434; Fernandez, supra note II, at 631-32. 
194 See BANKS, supra note 105, at 434; Fernandez, supra note 11, at 631-32. 
195 See Fernandez, supra note II, at 632; Lahey, supra note 14, at 11-2-1. 
196 See NAN'IUCKET HISTORY, supra note 136; VINEYARD GAZETTE ONLINE, supra note 
141. 
197 See BANKS, supra note 105, at 432; STARBUCK, supra note 108, at 354; NANTUCKET 
HISTORY, supra note 136; VINEYARD GAZETTE ONLINE, supra note 141. 
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cilitate these activities.19B In addition, consistent with the uses of trust 
lands inherent to these pursuits, local historians assert that a custom 
and usage arose under which islanders and natives shared the islands' 
trust resources, including their coastal beaches, in common.199 
While the original purpose for which the Ordinance changed the 
common law was not particularly relevant to the needs of the islands 
in the past, it is even less so today. Currently, tourism is the main in-
dustry of the islands, and it is the driving force behind their econo-
mies.20o It is therefore hard to discern the trust benefits arising fro~ 
excluding the public from the beaches of islands that do their best to 
generate tourist revenue by encouraging beach goers to visit their 
shores.20l Since the staples of the islands' economies are service in-
dustries associated with tourists, a law that could poten tially repel 
such visits would seem counterproductive to economic development 
on the islands, especially since the average per-capita income on the 
islands is considerably less than the rest of the commonwealth.202 
In addition, as currently applied, the Ordinance bestows special 
benefits upon private owners of trust lands to the detriment of the 
public. The private right of exclusion protected by the law has consid-
erably increased privately-owned beachfront property values, while 
the public is left with very limited access to these beaches.203 Although 
private beach owners on Nantucket seem to be generally amenable to 
allowing the public to use their beaches for recreation,204 under the 
current application of the Doctrine in Massachusetts they are, theo-
retically, within their rights if they choose to withdraw this access.205 
Therefore, emerging modern trust interests, like recreation on 
the beaches of Nantucket, are at the mercy of the whims of individual 
198 For instance, it was a conunon practice of Nantucket whalers to erect lookout tow-
ers and temporary huts along the island's beaches, where approximately six hunters would 
live, each, in turn, manning the tower and spotting for whales. STARBUCK, supra note 108, 
at 353. A whale, once captured, was towed ashore where the blubber was cut up and tryed 
out in temporary try-pots built on the shore. [d. Therefore, obstructing the shorelines by 
facilitating the construction of private wharves and piers would have inevitably led to 
conflicts between whalers and these private property owners. See Ghen v. Rich, 8 F. 159, 
159-60 (D. Mass. 1881). 
199 Interview, supra note 23. 
200 See Gautam, supra note 22, at 19. 
201 See id.; Interview, supra note 23. 
202 See Gautam, supra note 22, at 22; Interview, supra note 23. 
203 See Schweitzer, supra note 3, at B1. 
204 See In terview, S1t pra note 23. 
205 See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d 561,566-68 (Mass. 1974). 
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owners.206 Further, they are subject to the uncertainty arising from the 
possibility that such property may change hands to owners less enthu-
siastic about providing the public access to their property.207 As a re-
sult, the public is left with the hollow right of engaging in largely ir-
relevant traditional trust activities on the flats, while private owners 
enjoy a financial windfall arising from their right to, in most cases, 
totally exclude the public from their beaches. The potential danger of 
this situation is highlighted by the current state of affairs on Martha's 
Vineyard.208 On this island, most owners are unwilling to allow any 
general recreational use of their beaches, all but excluding the public 
from these beaches.209 This violation of the public's trust interest is 
therefore more egregious than that on Nantucket, but it arises from 
the same set of circumstances.210 
Judged by today's standards, and absent affirmative legislation 
suggesting otherwise, the above factors illustrate that the current ap-
plication of the Ordinance to the beaches of Nantucket and Martha's 
Vineyard is facially invalid and unnecessary, according to the federal 
framework regarding the Doctrine.211 In short, the public's jus publi-
cum rights on the flats of Nantucket and Martha's Vineyard were not 
considered by the framers of the Ordinance, were not consciously 
terminated, and the Ordinance has never had a valid purpose as ap-
plied to them. 
C. Reestablishing Trust Rights on Nantucket and Martha's Vineyard 
As illustrated above, there is an argument to be made that the 
provisions of the Ordinance do not apply to Nantucket and Martha's 
Vineyard as a matter of strict property law. Nevertheless, assuming 
that the opinions of the SJC regarding the commonwealth's flats are a 
valid interpretation of the Ordinance, an avenue still seems to exist 
for reclaiming the flats under Supreme Court precedent. Applying 
2Q6 See Interview, supra note 23. Mr. Fee has indicated that one island resident went so 
far as to place enormous boulders across his area of the beach to inhibit the public from 
passing through his property. Id. 
207 See id. Island officials also note that, although many wealthy landowners on the is-
land are eager to establish good relationships with the local community and therefore 
allow public access to their beaches, others prefer to keep a low profile and have no inter-
est in engendering the good will of islanders. Id. 
208 See Schweitzer, supra note 3, at Bl; Interview, supra note 23. 
209 See Schweitzer. supra note 3, at Bl; Interview, supra note 23. 
210 See, e.g., Opinion oftheJltstices, 313 N.E.2d at 566-68. 
211 See lll. Cent. R.R. v. lllinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453-56 (1892); Hoffman, supra note 62, at 
486. 
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Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois, and considering the poten tial 
economic boost to the islands' economies stemming from public 
beach access, it would seem that the previous legislative grant embod-
ied in the Ordinance is, in the context of the islands, "a proposition 
that cannot be defended," and perhaps should be revoked.212 For in-
stance, it does not seem that the economic benefits accruing to pri-
vate beachfront property owners from decreased public access to the 
beaches on Nantucket and Martha's Vineyard are outweighed by the 
overall benefits conferred upon the community, because it does not 
appear that any community benefits exist. This seems to present the 
precise circumstances described by the Supreme Court when it held 
that such legislative grants of trust lands may be revoked.213 
Considered in this light, the beach access bill addressed by the SJC 
in 1974 was deficient. Contrary to the SJC's reasoning, however, its fail-
ing lies not in the fact that it impaired the private right to eject the pub-
lic from trust lands, but rather in not degrading this right far 
enough.214 Under the federal/state sovereignty framework regarding 
the application of the Doctrine, it seems that the legislature was well 
within its right to revoke the grant of the flats to private owners alto-
gether.215 
Again, however, it would be hard to justifY grandfathering the is-
lands into the federal mandates regarding the Doctrine. Such action 
would likely produce a host of costly takings challenges.216 Further, it 
would not be good for the islands or the private owners.217 In fact, is-
land officials, at least on Nantucket, have explicitly indicated a reluc-
tance to pursue this course of action due to its potential detrimental 
effect on the island's economy.218 Therefore, perhaps a more flexible 
approach along the lines of the original intent of the Ordinance is in 
order. 
Controversy surrounding public use of private beaches on Nan-
tucket and Martha's Vineyard is likely to reemerge in the face of indi-
vidual action, as a result of initiatives such as that currently proposed 
by the Nantucket Board of Selectmen,219 or perhaps after another 
212 Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 453-56. 
213 See id. at 455, 460-64. 
214 See id.; Opinion oftltefustices, 313 N.E.2d at 567-68. 
215 See Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 455, 460-64. 
216 See Nantucket, Mass., Ordinance One Beach, Once and for all (Proposed 2003). 
217 See Interview, supra note 23. 
218 See Nantucket, Mass., Ordinance One Beach, Once and for all (Proposed 2003). 
219 See Interview, supra note 23. 
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state legislator is ejected from an island beach.220 Since the courts 
bear the lion's share of responsibility for degrading the public's trust 
in terests on the islands, they should do their part in rectifying this 
situation. Therefore, in response to these likely challenges to a more 
flexible interpretation of the Ordinance, the courts should, in effect, 
make a graceful exit from the stage of attempting to define the pub-
lic's trust rights. 
For instance, as illustrated by the Colonial Ordinance221 and sub-
sequent Supreme Court cases,222 as well as conventional state court 
modifications of the Doctrine in other areas of the co un try, state legis-
latures may modifY the Doctrine on the state level, according to the 
particular needs of society.223 For instance, because the legislature is 
well within its authority to affirmatively address specific time-based di-
lemmas facing the islands of Nantucket and Martha's Vineyard, simply 
codifYing the scope of protected trust activities in Massachusetts tide 
lands to include recreation would go a long way in resolving this issue. 
Therefore, in addition to using the flats for fishing, fowling, and 
navigation, the public would be able to stroll along the shore, as well 
as swim. Although the potential exists for rowdy teenagers and other 
members of the general public to exploit this window of access and 
spill over above the high tide line, this would seem to be the least in-
vasive method of beginning to address the issue. There would be no 
need to litigate the intent of ancient land titles, fundamentally alter 
property rights, or execute unpopular takings. 
On the other hand, this remedy is admittedly limited as the pub-
lic would only gain access to the flats, and local officials on Nantucket 
are interested in securing broader grants of beach access.224 Because 
220 Schweitzer. supra note 3, at Bl; Interview, supra note 23. 
221 See COLONIAL ORDINANCE, supra note 7, at 35. 
222 SeeApplebyv. New York, 271 U.S. 364. 399 (1926); TIL Cent. R.R. v. TIlinois. 146 U.S. 
387,460-64 (1892). 
223 See Mathews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 471 A.2d 255, 365 (NJ. 1984) (recog-
nizing that the right to enjoy the portion of the beach below the mean high-tide line re-
quired public access across the dry sand to access it); Borough of Neptune City v. Borough 
of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 54 (NJ. 1972) ("We have no difficulty finding that, in this 
latter half of the twentieth century. the public rights in tidal lands are not limited to the 
ancient prerogatives of navigation and fishing, but extend as well to recreational uses, 
including bathing. swimming and other shore activities."); Susan M. Codaro, A High Water 
Mark: The Article Iv, Section 2. Privileges and Immunities Clause and Nonresident Beach Access 
Restrictions. 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2525, 2532 (2003). In addition, the Oregon State Legisla-
ture has broadened the scope of the Doctrine, enacting a law to protect public access to 
dry sand areas of the beach, while the Texas Legislature has passed an act prohibiting the 
erection of structures that would impede the public's beach access. Codaro, supra at 2532. 
224 See Nantucket, Mass .• Ordinance One Beach, Once and for all (Proposed 2003). 
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their plan calls for a comprehensive set of easements from all of the 
islands' private beach owners, it will inevitably meet resistance from 
some individuals, and at least a limited number of eminent domain 
actions will likely have to be executed. If such local action is executed 
in conjunction with a legislative modification of trust rights, however, 
the public would gain both a vested right in a substantial portion of 
the beach, including that above the high tide line in some cases, as 
well as possess a vested interest in the entirety of the island's flats. In 
addition, such legislation would restore jus publicum on Martha's 
Vineyard-and the rest of the commonwealth, for that matter. 
Regardless ofthe avenue pursued to increase public access to the 
islands' private beaches, the courts can facilitate this by employing 
reasoning consistent with the SJC's decisions regarding the common-
wealth's great ponds when faced with controversies surrounding Mas-
sachusetts's version of the Doctrine.225 Therefore, rather than employ-
ing the strict textualist approach exhibited in the cases regarding the 
ocean flats, the SJC should adopt the overall philosophy that the Or-
dinance was meant to "declare a great principle of public right," and 
leave it to the legislature or local officials to define precisely what this 
right entails.226 Of course, the courts must still protect the integrity of 
trust rights in Massachusetts and remain faithful to the true intent of 
the Doctrine.227 It is likely that if it assumed its proper role, however, 
modification of the common law concerning the Doctrine in the 
commonwealth consistent with its true intent and spirit would be a 
forgone conclusion. 
CONCLUSION 
The rigid application of a flexible in terpretation of the public trust 
doctrine to the privately-owned beaches on Nantucket and Martha's 
Vineyard has resulted in a sort of historical acciden t, one in which a law 
meant to protect the public's access to unique resources and maximize 
the public's benefit from them now operates to do the exact opposite. 
As the public demand for access to trust resources for recreational ac-
tivities increases, and the stock of these unique treasures continues to 
wane, this problem is likely to remain at the forefront of property dis-
putes on Nantucket and Martha's Vineyard. Therefore, as the sovereign 
225 See, e.g., Lynnfield v. Peabody. 106 N.E. 977, 984-85 (Mass. 1914). 
226 See, e.g., Inhabitants of W. Roxbury v. Stoddard, 89 Mass. (7 Allen) 158, 164-69 
(1863). 
227 See ApplelTy, 271 U.S. at 399; Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 460-64. 
2004] The ShoTeline Public Tmst on Nantucket and Martha's Vineyard 463 
trustee of the public's rights under the Doctrine, this issue must be ad-
dressed by either the federal, state, or perhaps local government. 
History indicates that the islands were outside of the area origi-
nally contemplated by the Ordinance, and perhaps this law does not 
apply to them in a strict sense. Nevertheless, even assuming that the 
islands are subject to the Ordinance pursuant to their merger with 
Massachusetts in 1691, the current application of this law violates the 
overall intent of the public trust doctrine as mandated by the Su-
preme Court, and may possibly be revoked. There may be a less heavy-
handed approach to restore the public's trust rights in the flats. 
Before the beach access issue in Massachusetts may be addressed 
in any meaningful fashion, however, the courts must get out of the 
legislature's way and abandon their rigid interpretation of the Ordi-
nance regarding the commonwealth's flats. Instead, courts must em-
ploy the more pragmatic approach of the SJC's decisions regarding 
the great ponds. Perhaps in this manner the correct balance of trust 
rights can be reestablished on the islands of Nantucket and Martha's 
Vineyard. Although reclaiming the ocean flats of Massachusetts is a 
limited victory in the fight to allow public enjoyment of the common-
wealth's unique resources, it is nevertheless an important one. 

